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PRIVATIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Alex Kozinski*
Andrew Bentz**
INTRODUCTION
The question of what government should control exclusively and what it
should delegate to private entities is as old as government itself. In ancient
Greece, ownership of forests and mines rested with the government, but the
government “contracted out the work to individuals and firms.”1 And in
ancient Rome, the private sector “fulfilled virtually all of the state’s economic
requirements,” like tax collection, supplying the army, and feeding the sacred
geese of the Capitol.2 Though privatization is nothing new,3 it’s becoming an
increasingly important issue as government gets bigger and its functions
multiply. As the pressure to privatize increases, we must be mindful of its
advantages and pitfalls.
Privatization comes in two basic flavors.4 First is the shift in the production
of goods and services from the government to the private sector,5 such as
privatizing Amtrak or the Tennessee Valley Authority. This process belongs to
the world of law and economics6 and won’t be addressed here, except to say

*

Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Mr. Bentz is a former law clerk to the Honorable Alex Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (2012–2013) and is currently an associate at the Washington, D.C. law firm of Kellogg,
Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C. The views expressed in this Article do not reflect or represent
the views of the law firm.
1 William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, History and Methods of Privatization, in INT’L HANDBOOK
ON PRIVATIZATION 25, 25 (David Parker & David Saal eds., 2003).
2 ROBERT SOBEL, THE PURSUIT OF WEALTH: THE INCREDIBLE STORY OF MONEY THROUGHOUT THE
AGES 21 (2000); see PLUTARCHUS, THE ROMAN QUESTIONS OF PLUTARCH 161 (H. J. Rose ed. & trans., Arno
Press 1975) (1924).
3 See Germà Bel, Retrospectives: The Coining of “Privatization” and Germany’s National Socialist
Party, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 187, 187, 189–91 (2006) (documenting that the term “privatization” goes back to the
1930s).
4 Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 6, 13–14 (1988).
5 See id. at 14.
6 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135 (1998)
(explaining that “advances in the theories of ownership and contracting have reopened the question of state
versus private provision”).
**
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that privatization of production is generally a good thing. Moving in the
opposite direction—toward communism—doesn’t work.
This Article will focus on the second flavor of privatization, meaning the
shift of government functions to private control.7
As you likely know, privatization offers many benefits. When combined
with competition, it can improve efficiency and lower costs.8 FedEx and UPS
compete with each other and drive down prices, while still turning a profit.9
Contrast that with the U.S. Postal Service, which loses billions of dollars a
year.10
Privatization also leads to specialization. In fact, the modern administrative
state is built on the idea that the government needs agencies to specialize.11 For
example, areas like medicine and air quality are beyond Congress’s ability to
manage directly, so it established the FDA and the EPA. And sometimes, the
experts needed to work in these agencies are easier to find—or at least easier to
motivate using market incentives—in the private sector. Thus, by privatizing
certain government functions, we can allow private companies with specialized
expertise to run them.
When you combine competition and specialization, you get efficiency.
Efficiency isn’t something you can usually count on in government because the
incentives are misaligned.12 If you’re the government and your costs increase,
you can just raise taxes. But if you’re a private company, you have to figure
out how to reduce costs or increase revenue, or you’ll go bankrupt.
These benefits mean that privatization of many government functions is not
at all controversial. Nobody minds if Atlanta hires a private construction firm
to build a city office building. And we don’t complain when janitorial services
at federal buildings are performed by private contractors rather than
government employees. But what about privatizing core government
functions?

7

Starr, supra note 4, at 14.
See Shleifer, supra note 6, at 138–39.
9 See Suzanne McGee, UPS vs. FedEx: Two Plays on (Eventual) Global Recovery—Only One That’s
Low-Priced, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ycharts/2012/10/31/ups-vsfedex-two-plays-on-eventual-global-recovery-only-one-thats-low-priced/.
10 Ron Nixon, Postal Service Reports Loss of $15 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A22.
11 See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 654 (1973).
12 But see law clerks to Chief Judge Kozinski.
8
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Public institutions are public for a reason. Sometimes, it’s because of the
tragedy of the commons.13 We all need clean air and feel that the governing
rules should be written with public input and enforced by a politically
accountable entity, so we established the EPA. Sometimes, it’s a collective
action problem.14 We all need national defense and want to ensure that military
power is used at the direction of our elected, civilian commanders, so we
formed a public military. And sometimes, it’s a moral sensibility. We want to
deter crime and punish criminals, but we don’t want victims to exact private
retribution.
Privatizing such core government functions can give us some gains in
efficiency, but we risk forfeiting the benefits of the institutions’ public
character—in particular, equality and accountability.15 This Article will focus
on areas where the pressure to privatize and the challenges to equality and
accountability are most acute—education, prisons, the military, and the justice
system. By focusing on each of these in turn, we hope to highlight some of the
pitfalls of privatization and suggest some ways to avoid them.
I. EDUCATION
First, education. The most direct route to privatization is through vouchers.
Voucher programs allow parents to send their kids to private schools with
taxpayer money.16 The most famous advocate of school vouchers, Nobel
laureate Milton Friedman, argued that giving parents the option to choose their
children’s school would create free-market competition.17 “For Friedman and
those who follow[] him, the school voucher is a straightforward application of
first-year college economics to ameliorating poor school quality.”18
13 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) (explaining that
individuals, acting independently and rationally, will deplete a shared resource, despite their understanding
that depleting the common resource is contrary to the group’s long-term interests).
14 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 13–15 (1971) (noting that government services “must be available to everyone if they are available to
anyone” because it is not feasible “to deny [such services] to those who did not voluntarily pay their share of
the costs of government, and taxation is accordingly necessary”).
15 See Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Elusive Employee–Contractor Distinction, 46 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 133, 147–48 (2012) (discussing the argument that “contracting out for prison management,
military services, or other functions violates core commitments of public law”).
16 See Klint Alexander & Kern Alexander, Vouchers and the Privatization of American Education:
Justifying Racial Resegregation from Brown to Zelman, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1131, 1132.
17 Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support “Public” Schools, 48 B.C. L. REV. 909,
941 (2007).
18 Id.
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When you have a single school district, there’s often little competition
driving the public school to provide children with a better education.19
Opening up the market leads to competition among schools for funding, which
can lead to good results. It can drive down costs. For example, the Milwaukee
voucher system saved Wisconsin over fifty million dollars in 2011 alone.20
Voucher systems can also help kids. In Milwaukee, voucher students were
more likely to graduate from high school than their public-school
counterparts.21 And pupils who remain in public schools can benefit too. Even
though it undoubtedly drove some strong students to private schools, the
introduction of vouchers in Milwaukee is credited with driving up test scores
in public schools.22 Similarly, a study on the Florida voucher program found
that public schools facing pressure from voucher programs opted to change the
way they taught.23 They increased instructional time and teacher resources and
began targeting high-needs children.24 However, “once the threat of vouchers
goes away, so does the incentive for failing schools to improve.”25
But privatization can also undermine the advantages of public education.
The main reason we’ve committed to public education is to equalize access,
and we’ve spent decades trying to achieve it. When communities turn to
voucher programs, they must be mindful of the disparate effect these programs
can have on poor families.26 If private schools can charge more than the
voucher is worth, poor families still face a barrier to entry. The vouchers may
not be enough to pay for any private school that’s better than the public school

19 See id. (recognizing that monopolies hurt consumers while competitive markets “harness consumer
sovereignty to improve products for everyone”).
20 PATRICK J. WOLF, THE COMPREHENSIVE LONGITUDINAL EVALUATION OF THE MILWAUKEE PARENTAL
CHOICE PROGRAM: SUMMARY OF FINAL REPORTS 5 (2012), available at http://www.uark.edu/ua/der/SCDP/
Milwaukee_Eval/Report_36.pdf.
21 JOHN ROBERT WARREN, GRADUATION RATES FOR CHOICE AND PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS IN
MILWAUKEE, 2003–2009, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.schoolchoicewi.org/files/1613/6018/6466/2011Grad-Study-FINAL3.pdf.
22 Rajashri Chakrabarti, Can Increasing Private School Participation and Monetary Loss in a Voucher
Program Affect Public School Performance? Evidence from Milwaukee, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1371, 1372 (2008).
23 Cecilia Elena Rouse et al., Feeling the Florida Heat? How Low-Performing Schools Respond to
Voucher and Accountability Pressure 4–5 (Nat’l Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Educ. Research,
Working Paper No. 13, 2007).
24 Id. at 5.
25 Jay P. Greene & Marcus A. Winters, When Schools Compete: The Effects of Vouchers on Florida
Public School Achievement, at Executive Summary (Ctr. for Civic Innovation, Working Paper No. 2, 2003).
26 See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, School Vouchers, Thomas Jefferson, Roger Williams, and Protecting the
Faithful: Warnings from the Eighteenth Century and the Seventeenth Century on the Danger of Establishments
to Religious Communities, 2008 BYU L. REV. 525, 527.
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they’d be leaving.27 Moreover, if private schools are siphoning money from
public schools, they may leave the kids stuck in public schools far worse off.28
How do we fix this? One solution is to limit the amount schools can charge
on top of vouchers. The Ohio voucher program approved by the Supreme
Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris required that schools not charge the lowest
income families more than $250 over the voucher amount.29 Or we could
require schools to accept a certain percentage of students for the cost of the
voucher, perhaps based on need. Or, if we really wanted to level the playing
field, we could give out vouchers only to the truly needy.30
One other obvious concern with privatizing education is that it increases
the state’s involvement with religious schools. It’s true that a lot of voucher
money goes to religious schools. In Zelman, for example, ninety-six percent of
voucher students enrolled in religiously affiliated schools.31 Because money is
fungible, any funds paid by the government to help run a religious school
release an equal amount to support the school’s religious mission.
But what’s more interesting is the flip-side of the religious concern–
accountability. The state may lose a fair amount of control when schools are
privatized. One major cause of this is the Supreme Court’s understanding of
the Establishment Clause: If the government starts messing around with
religious schools too much, it might violate the third prong of the Court’s
Lemon test.32 So states have to be somewhat hands-off when it comes to
private schools. This lack of accountability may strike some as problematic, as
it may result in students in private schools getting an inferior secular education
compared to those in public schools.
In fact, the Florida Supreme Court struck down a voucher program largely
because of the lack of accountability.33 The court held that the voucher

27

Id. at 535.
Id. at 527 (“Vouchers put the poorest and least-able families at risk because, in the end, vouchers will
undermine educational quality in the public schools that those individuals with the fewest resources will still
be attending.”).
29 536 U.S. 639, 646 (2002).
30 See id. (recognizing that the vouchers were given based on financial need).
31 Id. at 647.
32 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13, 615 (1971) (explaining that a statute violates the
Establishment Clause if it fosters “an excessive government entanglement with religion” (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
33 See Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 409–10 (Fla. 2006).
28
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program violated article IX of the Florida Constitution,34 which requires the
legislature to provide a public school system that is “uniform.”35 The court
found that the voucher program allowed Florida to give money to private
schools that were “not subject to the same standards as those in force in public
schools.”36 And since article IX has been interpreted to require “uniform
operation throughout the State,” the diversion of money to private schools was
deemed to be unconstitutional.37
There’s no reason to debate Florida constitutional law here, but how much
of a problem is this in practice? Schools, after all, are accountable to
customers—the parents who send their children there.38 We trust parents to
make all sorts of decisions regarding the welfare of children, and parents are
generally pretty good at it. If parents are unhappy with their children’s
education at one school, they’ll pull them out and send them elsewhere. If
parents are happy with the school, they’ll keep their kids enrolled, and the
school will continue to get money. This system allows parents to hold schools
directly accountable.39
II. PRISONS
But there are other kinds of institutions, where there are no customers, or at
least no customers who can exercise choice. Prison—where the kids who
didn’t get a voucher end up—is a good example. We’ve had some form of
private prisons in America since our founding.40 But today, private prison
populations are ballooning. More than 100,000 convicts are in prisons run by
private companies.41 And from 1999 to 2010, the number of federal prisoners
in private custody increased by 784%.42

34

Id.
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 409.
36 Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 409.
37 Id. at 405, 412–13 (quoting State ex rel. Clark v. Henderson, 188 So. 351, 352 (Fla. 1939)).
38 See James Forman, Jr., The Rise and Fall of School Vouchers: A Story of Religion, Race, and Politics,
54 UCLA L. REV. 547, 600 (2007).
39 See Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 476 (Wis. 1992).
40 CODY MASON, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE: PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA 1
(2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Too_Good_to_be_True.pdf.
41 Id.; see also PAUL GUERINO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. NO. NCJ
236096, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 30 app. tbl.19 (2011), available at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf
(revised Feb. 9, 2012).
42 MASON, supra note 40, at 1.
35
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So we’re certainly on the way to prison privatization. But private prisons
present a troubling accountability problem. This was illustrated by the private
prison near Kingman, Arizona. Back in 2010, two convicted murderers
escaped from the privately run prison and murdered a couple taking a camping
trip.43 It turns out the private prison was being run like a “day care,” with a
broken alarm system and a lax security culture.44
These problems are likely the result of a lack of accountability. The lack of
state control of private schools isn’t such a serious problem because the private
schools serve customers who can take their business elsewhere. But with
prisons, we don’t have that same mechanism. The only real check on private
prisons is when the prison renegotiates its contract with the state.45
Professor Sasha Volokh has suggested that a prison voucher system might
introduce the same sorts of benefits we see with school vouchers.46 If prisoners
could choose where they served their time, prisons would compete for
money.47 According to Professor Volokh, that could increase security, improve
the quality of health care, and offer more forms of rehabilitation.48
But prisoners are not the only constituents served by prisons. In fact, one
might more accurately call prisoners anti-customers. The real customers are the
people on the outside who will suffer the detriments of poor prison
administration.49 Treating prisoners as the customers undermines the purpose
of punishment.50 An important aspect of punishment is loss of control. If
you’re in prison, you’re no longer allowed to eat when you want, go to sleep
and wake up when you want, watch TV when you want, have sex and visit
43 JJ Hensley, Family of Couple Killed by Arizona Inmates Files Lawsuit Against State, ARIZ. REPUBLIC
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/20110318arizona-inmates-killcouple-lawsuit.html.
44 Id.; see also Bob Ortega, Arizona Prison Oversight Lacking for Private Facilities: State Weighs
Expansion Even as Costs Run High, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/
20110807arizona-prison-private-oversight.html.
45 See Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 779, 822 (2012) (noting that if prisoners
can transfer out, “[o]nce a private provider gets a prison contract, if reputational and contract-renewal concerns
are weak, there are strong incentives to reduce quality”).
46 Id. at 784. Professor Volokh recognizes that there would be costs to a voucher system. Id. at 862–63.
His article “is meant to spur further research and debate on the question, not to come down on one side or
another.” Id. at 792.
47 See id. at 790 (hypothesizing that a prisoner voucher system would move prison administrators, “as if
by an invisible hand, to make their prisons better places”).
48 Id. at 796, 798–99.
49 See id. at 784–85.
50 See id. at 792.
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with family when you want. Your life is—to a great degree—controlled for
you. Prison vouchers ameliorate and undermine punishment by giving
prisoners some control over their lives. The prisoner now gets to choose where
he serves his time and under what conditions, making the sentence easier to
bear.51
And when it comes to accountability, prison vouchers cater to the wrong
customer.52 If prisons compete for funding based on what prisoners prefer,
prisons will start offering amenities that may be inconsistent with the goals of
punishment and security.53 Just imagine: “Come to Paradise Prison! We’ve got
the hottest showers in town, bed checks only every other week, and free WiFi
access at every bunk.”
Still, prisons do have important responsibilities to prisoners, and private
prisons do need to be held accountable if they fail to fulfill those duties. Civil
liability is one route.54 And until recently, that seemed like an effective tool for
holding private individuals doing government work accountable.55 But last
term, the Supreme Court told us that’s not always possible because of the
doctrine of qualified immunity.56
The case was Filarsky v. Delia.57 Nicholas Delia was a firefighter who got
sick when he responded to a toxic spill. He stayed home to rest, or at least
that’s what he told the city. While he was supposedly at home, Delia was
spotted buying building supplies. The city launched an investigation to see if
Delia was actually sick or just taking time off at government expense to
remodel his house. The city engaged an employment lawyer, Steve Filarsky, to
help with the investigation. While he was interviewing Delia, Filarsky ordered
him to produce the construction materials, the theory being that if Delia were

51

According to Professor Volokh, “nothing in this proposal requires treating prisoners as morally entitled
to choose.” Id. at 828. But whatever the motivations for allowing prisoners to choose, the end result is that
prisoners gain more control over their lives and may exercise preferences. The concern isn’t why we allow
prisoners to choose, but that the choice itself is incompatible with the purpose of prison.
52 See id. at 845–52 (“Solving the agency problem by allowing prisoners to choose may exacerbate these
negative externalities.” (footnote omitted)).
53 See id. at 844.
54 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1997).
55 See Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 F.3d 1069, 1081 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a private attorney
retained by a city was not shielded from civil suit), rev’d sub nom. Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657 (2012).
56 For general background on the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity cases, see generally Alexander
Volokh, Supreme Court Clarifies Standards for Qualified Immunity in Civil Rights Cases—Or Does It?,
REASON FOUND. (Apr. 5, 2013), http://reason.org/news/show/privatization-qualified-immunity.
57 132 S. Ct. 1657.
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indeed sick, he wouldn’t have used any of the materials. Delia complied but
later sued Filarsky under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Fourth
Amendment rights.58
It’s well established that government officials have qualified immunity, but
Filarsky was a private citizen.59 Was he, too, immune from suit? When
Filarsky came to the Ninth Circuit, we held that he had no immunity.60 But the
Supreme Court, as it likes to do, reversed us, 9–0.61
Now before you say, “Oh, that’s just the Ninth Circuit—it includes Stephen
Reinhardt,” it’s important to know that the case wasn’t so cut and dried. A
recent Supreme Court case involving a private prison, Richardson v.
McKnight,62 seemed to require denying Filarsky immunity. There, the Supreme
Court held that prison guards employed by a private firm were not entitled to
qualified immunity under § 1983.63 Perhaps you can see why the Ninth Circuit
came out the way it did in Filarsky. If the private actors in Richardson weren’t
immune, then it would seem neither was Filarsky.
But Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the full court, held that Filarsky was
different.64 To show how, he went back to 1871—when Congress passed
§ 1983.65 Back then, it would not have been unusual for a shopkeeper to serve
as the postmaster or for a ferryman to collect fees as a public wharfmaster.66 In
fact, private lawyers like Abraham Lincoln conducted criminal prosecutions.67
Since private citizens were so involved in carrying out public functions,
immunity didn’t depend on the defendant being a full-time government
employee.68 According to the Chief Justice, Filarsky was a modern-day

58

Id. at 1661.
Id. at 1661–62.
60 Delia, 621 F.3d at 1081.
61 Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1659, 1668.
62 521 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1997); see also Delia, 621 F.3d at 1080 (declining to rely on a Sixth Circuit
case which suggested that, in light of Richardson, private citizens may be entitled to qualified immunity);
Gonzalez v. Spencer, 336 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that the private citizen defendant
was not entitled to qualified immunity because “no special reasons significantly favor[ed] an extension of
governmental immunity” (quoting Richardson, 521 U.S. at 412) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
63 Richardson, 521 U.S. at 401–02.
64 Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1659.
65 Id. at 1662–63.
66 Id. at 1663.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1664.
59
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Abraham Lincoln, contracted by the state to conduct an investigation.69 In fact,
it’s a well-kept secret that Steven Spielberg’s next movie is called Filarsky.
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded, Filarsky should be entitled to the same
immunity as if he’d been a full-time city employee.70 This is clearly the right
result, and not just because it was nine–zip. It just makes sense to extend
immunity to those who do the government’s bidding.
But what’s troubling about Filarsky is where it leaves Richardson, the
prison guard case. It seems that Richardson was wrongly decided and should
have been overturned in Filarsky. As Justice Scalia said in dissent in
Richardson, the majority’s “holding is supported neither by common-law
tradition nor public policy, and contradicts our settled practice of determining
§ 1983 immunity on the basis of the public function being performed.”71 The
right result in Richardson was to hold the prison guards immune from suit. But
instead of overruling Richardson in Filarsky, Chief Justice Roberts attempted
to cabin the Richardson decision, saying it involved private individuals
employed by a private corporation.72 But those private individuals were still
performing government functions at the behest of the government and being
funded by taxpayer dollars. The tension between Filarsky and Richardson will
likely cause no end of trouble.
In any event, as far as Filarsky and Richardson are concerned, it doesn’t
matter whether they’re immune or not. As long as they know the rule, they can
build their contracts around it.73 Let’s say a company that contracts with
Georgia to run a prison knows that it’s going to face lawsuits from prisoners—
some justified, some not. If the company isn’t immune, it will demand more
money from the state to cover the cost of insuring against those lawsuits. If it’s
immune, the company’s price will be lower.
What this means is that by not providing immunity to the private prison
guards, we’re passing that cost on to Georgia. In essence, we’re penalizing
Georgia for privatizing, and this will diminish the efficiency gains from
privatizing prisons. It also creates a curious inequality problem: prisoners who
are housed in state-run prisons will face an immunity hurdle if they try to sue,
69

Id. at 1667.
Id. at 1667–68.
71 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 414 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72 Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1667.
73 Cf. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960) (explaining that without an
“initial delimitation of rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine [those rights]”).
70
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while those in privately run prisons will not. Thus, from the victim’s
perspective, recompense will depend entirely on the prison’s public or private
character.
III. MILITARY
Another area where privatization creates difficult accountability problems
is the military. Privatization of war is nothing new; mercenaries go back
thousands of years.74 And in America, the private sector has often been
contracted to supply the military.75 Nonetheless, we’ve seen a rapid increase in
the use of private contractors during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.76 So it’s
more important than ever to figure out how to keep them accountable.
The Department of Defense maintains that “[c]ontractor personnel are
civilians accompanying the U.S. Armed Forces.”77 In other words, they “are
not part of the operational chain of command.”78 And a bipartisan
congressional commission found that the reliance on contractors is
“overwhelming the government’s ability to effectively manage and oversee
contractors.”79 So if the military can’t manage them, who will? The
commission suggested one possible route: The Department of Defense could
require contractors to consent to U.S. civil jurisdiction as part of every
contract.80 The problem with that approach is that jurisdiction means nothing if
contractors can’t be held liable.
And it seems that contractors are virtually never liable. To see why, we
must go back half a century to Feres v. United States.81 In the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), Congress waived the government’s sovereign immunity
for certain tort claims.82 In Feres, a soldier (and some soldiers’ estates) tried to

74 Andrew Finkelman, Suing the Hired Guns: An Analysis of Two Federal Defenses to Tort Lawsuits
Against Military Contractors, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 395, 399 (2009).
75 Karen L. Douglas, Contractors Accompanying the Force: Empowering Commanders with Emergency
Change Authority, 55 A.F. L. REV. 127, 130 (2004).
76 Finkelman, supra note 74, at 399–400.
77 48 C.F.R. § 252.225–7040(b)(3) (2011).
78 U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REG. 715–19, OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT PLANNING AND
MANAGEMENT ch.4-1(d) (20 June 2011).
79 COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFGHANISTAN, TRANSFORMING WARTIME
CONTRACTING: CONTROLLING COSTS, REDUCING RISKS 2 (2011).
80 Id. at 160.
81 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
82 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006).
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sue the United States under the FTCA.83 But the Supreme Court held that
soldiers weren’t entitled to sue the government under the FTCA for injuries
they suffered while on duty.84 This concept became known as the Feres
doctrine.85
But the Feres doctrine doesn’t bar suits against government contractors,86
which means they could be sued under a number of laws, including the Alien
Tort Statute87 and state tort law.88 Nonetheless, these claims are largely D.O.A.
because of the military contractor defense the Supreme Court crafted in Boyle
v. United Technologies Corp.89 Boyle died when his helicopter crashed off the
coast of Virginia.90 While he survived the impact, he couldn’t get the escape
hatch open and drowned.91 His father filed suit under Virginia state tort law
against the contractor who built the helicopter, but the contractor claimed
immunity because it was working for the U.S. military.92
The Supreme Court explained that while the Feres doctrine immunized the
United States from suits brought under the FTCA, it didn’t protect contractors
from liability under other laws.93 Nonetheless, the FTCA played a prominent
role in Boyle. Congress didn’t fully waive the United States’ sovereign
immunity in passing the FTCA but instead preserved immunity for
discretionary functions and combatant activities.94
The Boyle Court explained that there is a “uniquely federal interest” in
“civil liabilities arising out of the performance of federal procurement
contracts.”95 There was also a significant conflict between state tort law and a
83

340 U.S. at 136–37.
Id. at 146.
85 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 687–88 (1987) (explaining that “the Feres doctrine
has been applied consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members against the Government based upon
service-related injuries”).
86 See, e.g., Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that
the Feres doctrine was inapplicable because the defendant contractor was a “distinct entity” that could not be
described as a government employee).
87 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
88 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506 (1988).
89 Id. at 501; see generally VIVIAN S. CHU & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41755, TORT
SUITS AGAINST FEDERAL CONTRACTORS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL ISSUES 12–15 (2011) (explaining the
government contractor defense).
90 487 U.S. at 502.
91 Id.
92 See id. at 502–03.
93 See id. at 509–10.
94 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), (j) (1982).
95 487 U.S. at 505–06 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84
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federal law, namely the discretionary functions exception to the FTCA.96 The
Court held that “the selection of the appropriate design for military equipment
to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function within the
meaning of this provision.”97 Thus, the unique federal interest and the conflict
between state and federal law meant that the state law was preempted,
providing the contractor with a defense.98
While Boyle dealt with a procurement contract,99 Boyle’s logic was
extended to service contracts by the D.C. Circuit in Saleh v. Titan Corp.100 The
contractors in that case provided interrogation services at the infamous Abu
Ghraib prison.101 This, by the way, must be a great line on somebody’s résumé:
2003–2004, Interrogation Services, Abu Ghraib, Iraq. There are probably many
jobs where that credential will come in handy (mainly in New Jersey).
In Saleh, several Iraqis asserted various tort claims against the
contractors,102 but the D.C. Circuit held that the combatant activities exception
served to preempt those claims because the contractors were “integrated into
combatant activities over which the military retain[ed] command authority.”103
Perhaps this is right: Contractors should be effectively immune in the vast
majority of cases. Nevertheless, sovereign immunity is built on the assumption
that the government is accountable to the people through the political
process.104 Because military contractors aren’t accountable to the people,
liability seems to be an appropriate tool for holding them accountable. No
doubt what’s animating these decisions are the concerns expressed earlier,
namely that the cost of liability borne by the contractor will inevitably be
passed on to the government.105 If we hold contractors liable, we effectively

96

Id. at 511.
Id.
98 See id. at 511–13 (“[W]e are of the view that state law which holds Government contractors liable for
design defects in military equipment does in some circumstances present a ‘significant conflict’ with federal
policy and must be displaced.”).
99 Id. at 502, 505.
100 580 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
101 Id. at 2.
102 Id. at 2–3.
103 Id. at 9.
104 See Gregory C. Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 55 VILL. L. REV. 899, 900
(2010) (“[F]ederal sovereign immunity fits comfortably with popular sovereignty, divided and diminished
government power, and political accountability for public officers.”).
105 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511–12 (1988); Trevor Wilson, Comment, Operation
Contractor Shield: Extending the Government Contractor Defense in Recognition of Modern Warfare
Realities, 83 TUL. L. REV. 255, 273 (2008).
97
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undermine the government’s immunity.106 And even though the Court has held
contractors can’t sue the United States for indemnity,107 contractors can still
build the cost of insurance into their contracts.
IV. JUSTICE
One final area of privatization that illustrates problems of both inequality
and accountability is the justice system. I’m sure you all know about
alternative dispute resolution, or ADR. That’s where you and your opponent go
(sometimes you’re ordered to go) to work out your problems with a mediator
or arbitrator. Even if ADR is a foreign word to you, you’ve surely seen Judge
Wapner or Judge Judy meting out justice on TV.
ADR is often court-sanctioned. For example, in the Ninth Circuit we have a
very successful mediation program.108 But you can also hire private companies
to mediate your disputes.109 In California, you can actually have a private trial.
For a fee, ADR Services, Inc. will give you a retired state judge, and the jury’s
verdict will be “entered in the court as if the trial were conducted there.”110
The benefits are obvious. First, the trial is private and can be kept
private.111 For example, if Apple and Microsoft have a nasty dispute about
software and don’t want the bad publicity that goes with a lawsuit, they can go
have a private trial. Also, parties can handpick the judge.112 It might be useful
to have someone who knows something about computers and technology
presiding over the trial, rather than a random judge down at superior court.113
In addition, cases are typically resolved faster through ADR. In Los
Angeles, it usually takes more than a year to get to trial, which is still better

106

See supra text accompanying notes 70–73.
Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673–74 (1977).
108 Alex Kozinski, Mediation in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: A Message from
the Chief Judge, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/mediation/ (last visited
Dec. 11, 2013).
109 See ADR SERVICES, INC., http://www.adrservices.org (last visited Dec. 11, 2013); RESOL. REMEDIES,
http://www.resolutionremedies.com (last visited Dec. 11, 2013).
110 Private Trials, ADR SERVICES, INC., http://www.adrservices.org/private-trials.php (last visited Dec.
11, 2013).
111 Id.
112 The ADR Process—Private Trials, RESOL. REMEDIES, http://www.resolutionremedies.com/adr_
process/private-trials.asp (last visited Dec. 11, 2013).
113 Id. (“Some cases present complex legal and technical issues, and it will often serve the interests of all
parties [to] have an arbitrator who has particular expertise in the area of law involved.”).
107
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than what it used to be: five years.114 With court funding slashed because of
budget shortfalls, the time to trial will inevitably increase.115 A private trial can
happen as soon as the parties are ready.116 And here’s where the inequality
comes in: Apple and Microsoft can afford to buy their way out of the justice
system, but the average litigant can’t.
Whether litigants should be able to do this is a tough question, but health
care presents a useful analogy for consideration. In Canada, health care is
delivered through a publicly funded health care system.117 Each province is
responsible for financing and regulating a statewide health insurance
program.118 Some provinces, including Quebec, made it illegal to buy private
medical insurance, which meant that everyone had to use the same publicly
funded services.119 Think of it like the transplant list here in the United States.
If you need a heart, you have to wait your turn; you can’t buy one legally.120
The prohibition on private health care in Quebec translated into long lines.
As one doctor put it, while “dogs can get a hip replacement in under a
week . . . humans can wait two to three years.”121 A few years ago, though, the
Canadian Supreme Court struck down the prohibition for the province of
Quebec.122 The bitterly divided court held that the long waits and inability to
access private health insurance violated the Quebec Charter for Human Rights
and Freedoms.123
In America, we tend to favor money as the way to ration; other countries,
like Canada, focus on equality.124 Both forms of rationing have their
drawbacks. Rationing by money means the poor suffer. Indeed, if we ration
based solely on money, poor people could be shut out entirely.
114 Kevin O’Leary, And Justice for Some: L.A.’s Shrinking Court System, TIME (Mar. 21, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1973909,00.html.
115 Id.
116 Cf. Christopher Baum, The Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest
Development Disputes, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 907, 924 (2010) (recognizing that disputes in arbitration are
resolved more quickly).
117 Raisa Berlin Deber, Health Care Reform: Lessons from Canada, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 20, 20
(2003).
118 Id. at 21.
119 Chaoulli v. Québec (Att’y Gen.), [2005] S.C.R. 791, 805 (Can.).
120 See Amy Harmon, Auction for a Kidney Pops Up on Ebay’s Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, at A13.
121 Clifford Krauss, Canada’s Private Clinics Surge as Public System Falters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006,
at A3 (quoting Dr. Brian Day, president and medical director of the Cambie Surgery Centre).
122 Chaoulli, [2005] S.C.R. at 793, 842.
123 Id.
124 See Deber, supra note 117, at 21.
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But rationing on the basis of strict equality means that the system misses
out on the money that the rich would have paid into the system. Those dollars
could be used for research or to provide free care for poor people. In addition,
allowing the rich to buy their way out takes them out of the public line,
meaning poor people move up in line. Then again, if too many people are able
to buy their way out of the system, the system will lose its public support and
funding, leaving less for those stuck in it. This is much the same problem as
with school vouchers.
It’s also the same challenge we face when we allow people to buy their way
out of the judiciary. Rich people get justice faster, and perhaps better; poor
people have to wait years to see their case go to trial. As we increase our
reliance on ADR, we have to be mindful of who gets to use it, and whether it’s
fair to those left behind.
So far, we’ve been discussing only civil litigants, but you might be
surprised to learn that criminals, too, can sometimes bypass the public court
system.
Last year at a KFF,125 we screened an Australian film called Face to
Face.126 It follows the story of a guy who crashes into his boss’s car in a fit of
anger, but instead of going through the criminal court system, he participates in
something called restorative justice, where all the parties to the dispute are
encouraged to work out their differences.127 We don’t want to give away what
happens, but the movie provides an introduction to the concept.
Now, you’re probably thinking: Of course Australia is soft on crime; the
country was founded by criminals. The United States would never have a
program like that. In fact, several U.S. cities, like Baltimore and Minneapolis,
already have such programs.128
So does restorative justice work? There’s not much data because there
aren’t many programs, but one study found that it does have benefits.129
Victims see a reduction in post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms.130 And

125 Kozinski’s Favorite Flicks. This is a regular event where members of the Ninth Circuit community are
invited to see a film selected by Chief Judge Kozinski.
126 FACE TO FACE (MouseTrap Films 2011).
127 Id.
128 Paul Tullis, Forgiven, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 6, 2013, at 28, 32.
129 See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN & HEATHER STRANG, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THE EVIDENCE 4 (2007).
130 Id.

KOZINSKI&BENTZ GALLEYSPROOFS

2013]

PRIVATIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

1/21/2014 3:56 PM

279

perhaps most importantly, when restorative justice is offered to arrestees, more
offenses are brought to justice.131
But is there a limit to the type of crime that can be dealt with through
restorative justice? Let me tell you a recent story that comes from the Florida
Panhandle.132 Conor and Ann had been dating for three years.133 Her parents
thought that Conor was going to be the father of their grandchildren. So it’s not
surprising that when Ann’s mother got word that her daughter had been shot,
her first thought was to ask whether Conor was with her. He was indeed. It was
the culmination of a nearly two-day fight. Ann was on her knees pleading,
“No, don’t,” when Conor pulled the trigger.134
After Conor had been arrested and charged with first-degree murder, Ann’s
parents said they didn’t want Conor to spend his life in prison and began
looking for an alternative path.135 Eventually, together with Conor’s parents,
they contacted Sujatha Baliga, who runs a restorative justice program.136
Baliga said restorative justice would never work in Florida, at least not for a
homicide.137 “We do burglaries, robberies,” Baliga said.138 “There’s never been
a murder case that’s gone through restorative justice.”139 Nonetheless, Ann’s
parents persisted and eventually organized a pre-plea conference—a meeting
where everything is off the record and anyone can attend.140
At the meeting, Ann’s parents spoke first and related how Ann’s death had
affected them.141 In the words of the prosecutor, “It was excruciating to listen
to them talk . . . . It was as traumatic as anything I’ve ever listened to in my
life.”142
Then Conor spoke about what had happened, how he and Ann had started
fighting and how he’d wanted to scare Ann with the gun so they’d stop
fighting.143
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id.
See Tullis, supra note 128, at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
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At the conclusion of the conference, everyone gave their recommended
sentence. Ann’s mom said five to fifteen years. Ann’s father, ten to fifteen.
Conor’s parents agreed with ten to fifteen years. And “Conor said he didn’t
think he should have a say” in the matter.144
The prosecutor refused to come up with a figure, and with that the
conference was over. Ann’s parents were devastated and feared that all their
work had been for naught. But after some time, the prosecutor came around
and offered Conor twenty years in prison plus probation, which Conor
accepted.145
While Conor’s story isn’t a complete privatization of criminal justice, it’s
an illustration that private justice can work. Ninth Circuit mediators have even
managed to resolve capital cases.146
Restorative justice offers a number of benefits. It saves court resources,
which is good for taxpayers.147 The defendant may get a better plea deal than if
his sentence were up to the prosecutor alone.148 And it allows the victims to be
hands-on participants instead of helpless bystanders. 149
Nonetheless, the effects on equality and accountability could be serious.
First, the system doesn’t work with all crimes. For example, what do we do
with victimless crimes?150 It’s hard to imagine what a restorative justice
meeting would look like where the defendant was accused of drug possession,
hunting bald eagles, or being in the United States illegally.
More importantly, restorative justice makes equalizing sentences among
criminals more difficult. Certain segments of society (Wall Street bankers) are
more likely to go through restorative justice than others (gang members). And
this will exacerbate inequalities already present in the criminal justice
system.151

144

Id. at 35.
Id.
146 Kozinski, supra note 108.
147 SHERMAN & STRANG, supra note 129, at 86.
148 See id. at 23.
149 See id. at 4, 62.
150 See id. at 8.
151 See generally BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY
the prison boom from 1970 to 2003 and its effects on racial inequality).
145
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Accountability is also a problem in this system. By diverting criminals to
restorative justice, society loses some ability to hold them accountable.
Although Conor went to prison, Florida lost something in the process. There
was no public trial, and no jury decided on guilt or punishment. Instead, a deal
was struck in private with only the victim’s parents, the perpetrator and his
family, and the prosecutor participating. Then again, the process was no less
public than an ordinary plea bargain, which is how most criminal cases are
resolved these days.152
*

*

*

No question about it, privatization has benefits: competition, specialization,
and efficiency among them. But privatization of government functions also
raises a number of serious challenges, some of which we’ve tried to illustrate
by reference to various examples. To summarize, these challenges are:
1. The difficulty of maintaining accountability when those affected by the
activity, positively or negatively, have no economic control because the
contractor is compensated by taxpayer dollars.
2. The risk that the incentives or disincentives of private contractors will
not align with the interests of the public, and the private contractors will
therefore undermine the focus of the governmental mission.
3. The disadvantages and benefits of allowing some people to opt out of
governmental services by buying their way out of the system, leaving other
(usually poorer) participants to rely on what may be second-rate public
services.
4. The problem of governmental immunity as applied to government
contractors who perform public functions.
5. The risk that some activities that are public in character will be made
private and disappear from public scrutiny.
These problems aren’t intractable. At least we hope they’re not. By
remembering to protect the essence of public institutions, we can develop
systems that not only reap the rewards of the open market but also preserve the
equality and accountability that these institutions require. Emory Law
152 See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer
Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1121 (2011) (“From the 1970s through the early 2000s, plea bargains
resolved the vast majority of criminal cases in the United States.”).
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Journal’s symposium is an important step toward meeting these challenges,
and the contributions made by the distinguished panelists will serve to better
equip all of us as we move toward more and more privatization.

